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Russia has experienced a turbulent relationship with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ever since it joined the Council of Europe in 1996. Russian citi-
zens have overloaded the system with petitions, and the ECtHR 
frequently has chided the Russian state for failing to address the 
underlying conditions that lead to these recurring human rights 
violations. At the same time, the 1993 Russian Constitution 
remains remarkably open to international law, and ECtHR deci-
sions have been repeatedly cited by Russia’s highest constitutional 
tribunal — the Constitutional Court — in its determinations 
dealing with civil and social rights.
In 2011, however, the relationship between these two 
judicial bodies suffered a serious breach as a result of the 
ECtHR’s contentious ruling in the case involving the Russian 
serviceman Konstantin Markin. For the first time, the ECtHR 
essentially overruled a decision by the Russian Constitutional 
Court, thereby provoking a storm of protest from Russia’s leading 
jurists and politicians. Given that 
the ECtHR’s effectiveness is predi-
cated on a surrender of national 
sovereignty and the willingness of 
member states to abide by inter-
national court decisions, a residual 
amount of stress is inevitable 
between the court and its members. 
But while Russia may not be alone 
on this front, its relations with the 
ECtHR nevertheless appear to be 
under almost permanent strain.
This article will take an in-depth 
look at the Markin case and how the 
question of parental leave nearly 
drove a permanent wedge between 
Russia and the ECtHR. Yet as this 
analysis demonstrates, for all the 
controversy that accompanied the 
Markin decision, the overall debate 
was tempered by a mutual recognition 
that the substantive legal interac-
tions between Russia and the ECtHR have been, on the whole, 
productive. Therefore, this article will explore why — despite 
the simmering tensions and the occasional eruption — Russia 
continues to subject itself to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.
The Markin Case
Konstantin Markin seems like an unlikely person to incite a 
major constitutional crisis. A radio intelligence operator in the 
Russian military and recently divorced father of three, Markin 
sought three years parental leave from the army to take care of 
his young children (including an infant). By law, such a right 
is legally owed to servicewomen, but a Russian military court 
determined that servicemen were entitled to only three months 
of leave. Markin pursued multiple appeals, ultimately reaching 
the Russian Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, 
however, proved less than sympathetic to Markin’s request; it 
concluded that Markin was not entitled to such an extended 
leave, in part because by signing up for military service, he 
had implicitly agreed to certain limitations to his civil rights 
and freedoms.1 The Court also pointed to the special social 
role assigned to motherhood (but evidently not fatherhood) set 
forth in Article 38(1) of the Russian Constitution, which states 
that: “Motherhood and childhood, 
and the family shall be under state 
protection.”2
Markin’s legal options were 
not exhausted, however, even after 
Russia’s highest constitutional 
tribunal rejected his appeal. 
Instead, Markin took advantage 
of an opportunity that tens of thou-
sands of his fellow citizens have 
pursued since Russia joined the 
Council of Europe in 1996 — the 
right to file a complaint with the 
European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. The ECtHR has 
provided an important check on the 
Russian legal system; it has called 
for “general” changes to Russian 
law to secure basic civil rights 
and freedoms, as well as imposed 
significant financial penalties on 
the Russian state for individual 
violations of human rights. While Russia generally has a good 
record of paying the fines, it has not been responsive in address-
ing the ECtHR’s demand to reform the underlying deficiencies 
within the Russian legal system.3
So Markin turned to the ECtHR, specifically arguing that 
the Russian Federation had violated Article 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. This provision declares that the 
rights set forth in the Convention shall be “secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
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association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”4 The ECtHR further considered this non-discrimination 
clause in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, which 
states that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and correspondence,” and forbids public 
interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right.5
Thus, the ECtHR elevated a 
social right — the right to paren-
tal leave — to a broader question 
of civil rights regarding equal 
treatment of the sexes. The 
ECtHR dismissed the Russian 
Constitutional Court’s special 
treatment of “motherhood.” While 
recognizing the differences 
between a mother and a father, the 
ECtHR stated, “[A]s far as tak-
ing care of the child during this 
period [infancy] is concerned, both 
parents are ‘similarly placed.’”6 
Moreover, the ECtHR rejected the 
Constitutional Court’s claim that 
the taking of parental leave by 
servicemen would somehow have 
a negative impact on the fighting power of the Russian armed 
forces.7 It concluded that the Russian Constitutional Court had 
failed to provide sufficient justifications for imposing much 
stronger restrictions on the family life of servicemen than on 
servicewomen,8 and called on the Russian state to take the 
“appropriate general and/or individual measures to secure 
the right of the applicant.”9 Markin himself was not awarded 
any pecuniary damages, in part because the Russian state had 
allowed him to take substantial parental leave during the course 
of this dispute and had even paid financial aid to Markin on an 
exceptional basis.10 Markin did receive a small award for costs 
and expenses, but it was broader legal principle — and the per-
ceived attack on the integrity of the Russian legal system — that 
opened up the rift between the Constitutional 
Court and the ECtHR.
Russia Responds
On the surface, the ECtHR has issued 
far more controversial decisions against the 
Russian state than the Markin verdict. Through 
a series of rulings, the ECtHR has put a 
glaring spotlight on Russia’s massive human 
rights abuses in Chechnya.11 In September 
2011, the ECtHR issued a split ruling in the 
complaint filed by Yukos shareholders that, 
while rejecting a political motivation behind 
the Russian state’s prosecution of the company, 
nevertheless found that the company’s right 
to a fair trial had been violated.12 This deter-
mination may yet end up costing the Russian 
government significant damages. The ECtHR 
also ruled against Vladimir Putin’s tightly 
controlled political system by declaring in April 
2011 that Russia’s law on political parties was 
draconian and in violation of Article 11 of the European Convention 
(freedom of association).13
And yet, despite losing several high-profile cases, it was the 
Markin decision that seemingly provoked the greatest indigna-
tion among Russia’s judicial and 
political elite. The Markin ruling 
reverberated primarily because it 
represented the first time that the 
ECtHR had essentially overridden a 
Russian Constitutional Court deter-
mination. Russian citizens can file 
a petition with Strasbourg when 
a decision becomes “final” under 
Russian law. For procedural reasons 
beyond the scope of this article, this 
moment presently occurs at the cas-
sation (broadly speaking, the final 
appellate) level, not after a decision 
by one of Russia’s three “supreme” 
courts.14 Thus, rather than neces-
sarily reviewing Constitutional 
Court decisions, ECtHR rulings 
mainly have responded to defi-
ciencies within the Russian legal 
system (for example, the inability 
to enforce decisions), or otherwise addressed violations of indi-
vidual rights by Russian law enforcement or other parts of the 
Russian bureaucracy.
The Markin ruling raised the legal stakes in the ECtHR’s 
relationship with Russia by openly disputing a Constitutional 
Court determination. Not surprisingly, this action roused 
the displeasure of the Constitutional Court’s longstanding 
chairman, Valerii Zorkin. Zorkin is well-known for making 
extra-judicial statements and engaging in public debate to a 
degree that would be unthinkable to a U.S. Supreme Court chief 
justice. In this instance, although Zorkin warned against over-
politicizing the ECtHR’s action, he nevertheless insisted that 
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the decision showed a lack of respect for Russia’s legislators as 
well as represented a fundamental challenge to Russia’s national 
sovereignty.15
Zorkin further objected to the ECtHR’s actions on legal 
grounds. His argument focused on Article 15(4) of the Russian 
Constitution, which recognizes international treaties as an “inte-
gral part of the Russian legal system” and serves as the main 
conduit by which ECtHR decisions enter Russian law. Zorkin 
conceded that in those instances where an international treaty 
establishes rules other than those “provided by the law,” the 
rules of the international treaty would apply. Zorkin argued, 
however, that this analytical framework only applied to conflicts 
between international treaties and Russian laws, not between 
international agreements and the Russian Constitution itself. As 
a result, while the European Convention remained an integral 
part of the Russian legal system pursuant to Article 15(4), it was 
not, according to Zorkin, higher than the Russian Constitution. 
In other words, the Russian Constitutional Court’s interpretation 
of the Constitution could not be trumped by an alternative expla-
nation of the European Convention by the ECtHR.16
Zorkin’s assertion of the supremacy of the constitution 
within Russia’s hierarchy of laws — and the Constitutional 
Court’s singular right to interpret 
the constitution — was quickly sec-
onded by Russian President Dmitrii 
Medvedev, who issued a sweeping 
statement that “we will never sur-
render that part of our sovereignty, 
which would allow any interna-
tional court or any foreign court 
to render a decision, changing our 
national legislation.”17 Aleksandr 
Torshin, then acting chairman of 
the Federation Council, the upper 
house of Russia’s legislature, went so 
far as to propose legislation to con-
solidate the Constitutional Court’s 
position vis-à-vis the ECtHR. 
Under this draft law, any deci-
sion by an “interstate organ” would 
only be fulfilled if the Russian 
Constitutional Court confirmed 
that the norms called into question did not correspond with the 
Russian Constitution.18 In effect, under Torshin’s proposal, the 
Constitutional Court would essentially exercise veto power over 
the ECtHR.
Torshin’s draft legislation triggered an immediate reaction 
from the Russian human rights community, which accused the 
Russian government of breaching its underlying commitment 
to the European Convention.19 Critics further cited the bill as 
a violation of the Russian Constitution’s recognition of interna-
tional law as an integral part of Russian law.20 Judge Anatolii 
Kovler, Russia’s representative on the ECtHR, reported that 
Torshin’s initiative had created unease among the court’s leader-
ship in Strasbourg.21 Finally, the secretariat of the Constitutional 
Court weighed in with its own analysis of the proposal, high-
lighting several procedural irregularities.22 It appears that 
this combination of political and technical considerations led 
to the draft legislation’s withdrawal in July 2011.23
Russia’s uneasy Relationship with the eCthR
The controversy surrounding Torshin’s proposal represents 
just one in a series of ongoing disputes between Moscow and 
Strasbourg. In reality, Russia has tested the ECtHR’s patience 
on several occasions since its accession to the Council of Europe 
in 1996. From the beginning, the Council of Europe recognized 
that Russia lacked many of the fundamental legal protections 
required for the basic defense of human rights; nevertheless, 
Russia was still admitted as a member based on the optimistic 
proposition that “integration is better than isolation; cooperation 
is better than confrontation.”24
These high hopes, however, have not necessarily been realized 
in practice. As previously noted, Russians quickly distinguished 
themselves by filing the largest number of petitions to the 
ECtHR, in the process exposing the magnitude of the human 
rights abuses within the country.25 When Russia failed to address 
the underlying conditions that led to many repeat petitions 
on the same problem (the non-enforcement of domestic court 
decisions), the ECtHR issued a 
pilot judgment against Russia. This 
procedure, specifically established 
by the ECtHR to deal with large 
groups of identical cases, called 
on Russia to establish an effec-
tive domestic remedy to address 
the non-enforcement (or delayed 
enforcement) of domestic judg-
ments.26 The ECtHR also reacted to 
the surfeit of Russian petitions by 
introducing new expedited review 
procedures through Protocol 14. 
Russia dragged its feet on ratifying 
this Protocol, to the growing frus-
tration of the other member states. 
Russia only approved Protocol 14 
after the other 46 member countries 
agreed to introduce the expedited 
review process through an alterna-
tive procedure (Protocol 14-bis), 
thereby highlighting Russia’s intransigence and seeming unwill-
ingness to resolve a problem primarily of its own making.27
The Markin case, therefore, represents one of a series of 
confrontations that have raised serious questions about Russia’s 
future commitment to the court. Yet for all this tension — and 
the apparent opportunities for Russia to abandon the court alto-
gether — Russia nevertheless has made a conscious decision to 
remain a member. No doubt a dramatic exit from the ECtHR 
would have significant political and symbolic consequences for 
Russia; how could Russia maintain its standing in Europe if it 
deliberately removed itself from the Council of Europe’s judi-
cial institutions? On a more practical note, the Constitutional 
Court would lose a critical partner and legal pillar if Russia 
precipitously withdrew from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. Indeed, 
Zorkin later backpedaled from his strong statements objecting 
to the ECtHR’s interference in Russian affairs. In the past few 
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years, Zorkin stated, the Constitutional Court had been accused 
of ignoring or otherwise devaluing the decisions of the ECtHR. 
Zorkin rejected such charges; we never said, he argued, “that 
it was not necessary to fulfill the decisions of the European 
Court. We only disagreed with 
those who view the legal posi-
tion of the European Court 
as orders requiring changes 
in Russian legislation, which 
must be unconditionally ful-
filled.”28 “Without knowledge 
of the actual Strasbourg deci-
sions,” Zorkin emphasized in 
another interview, “the realiza-
tion of justice in Russia now is 
impossible.”29
The Russian Constitutional 
Court, in fact, has played an 
essential role in the integration 
of the European Convention 
— and ECtHR decisions — 
into Russian law. Zorkin him-
self claimed that more than 50 
Constitutional Court decisions 
have been based on positions of 
the ECtHR, with profound con-
sequences for Russian law and the Russian legal system.30 It was 
the Russian Constitutional Court, for example, that demanded 
that the Civil Procedure Code be brought into agreement with 
Russia’s other procedural codes, thereby recognizing ECtHR 
decisions as a “newly discovered circumstance” that allowed for 
the re-opening of civil cases.31 The Constitutional Court also 
relied on the Convention and ECtHR decisions to call for funda-
mental changes in Russia’s archaic system of supervisory review 
(nadzor) and the introduction of a more transparent appellate 
process.32 Thus, without minimizing the disagreements between 
the two bodies, the ECtHR has provided the initial impetus 
— and de facto precedent — for several major Constitutional 
Court rulings.
The QuesTion of naTional sovereignTy
That Russia should find itself at loggerheads with the ECtHR 
is, in many ways, not surprising in light of the experience of 
other member states. Several countries have challenged the 
ECtHR’s authority after finding themselves on the losing side of 
a Strasbourg decision. In one of the most well-known examples, 
the German Constitutional Court concluded in the Görgülü 
case33 that while the European Convention enjoyed the status 
of federal law, administrative bodies and courts could not free 
themselves from German constitutional and statutory require-
ments merely by relying on ECtHR decisions. As a result, the 
German Constitutional Court called on domestic courts to take 
ECtHR decisions “into account” when interpreting fundamental 
rights and constitutional guarantees, as opposed to necessarily 
being bound by such rulings.34
Other cases have provoked even greater controversy. The 
ECtHR and Italy conducted a protracted debate over the 
placement of crucifixes in state classrooms.35 Meanwhile, the 
United Kingdom remains at odds with Strasbourg regarding 
how to implement the ECtHR’s decision granting prisoners 
the right to vote.36 Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron 
voiced his frustration with Strasbourg during his address to the 
Council of Europe on January 
25, 2012. While congratulat-
ing the ECtHR for its many 
successes, Cameron neverthe-
less warned that Strasbourg 
had become the court of fourth 
instance, giving an “extra bite 
of the cherry to anyone dissatis-
fied with a domestic ruling.”37 
He added that decisions made 
at the national level should 
be “treated with respect,” and 
that “when controversial rul-
ings overshadow the good and 
patient long-term work that has 
been done, that not only fails 
to do justice to the work of the 
Court, it has a corrosive effect 
on people’s support for human 
rights.”38
Russia clearly lacks the 
human rights record of other 
European nations that would allow it to rebuke the ECtHR for 
undue interference with its domestic enforcement of civil and 
social rights. Yet an inherent tension invariably is part of the 
relationship between the ECtHR and its member states, a fact 
acknowledged by the court itself. In an October 2011 speech in 
Moscow on the occasion of the Russian Constitutional Court’s 
20th anniversary, the outgoing chairman of the ECtHR Jean-Paul 
Costa recognized that although disagreements existed between 
the two judicial bodies, “our courts have a common aim.”39 
Costa proceeded to add that while it was impossible to limit the 
number of conflicts, it was “important to preserve a permanent 
dialogue.”40 Such conciliatory remarks suggested that even the 
Markin case would not cause a permanent rupture in relations 
between the ECtHR and the Russian Federation, as many feared.
The Defense of social righTs in russia
The controversy surrounding the Markin case already has 
had repercussions within the Russian legal system. Most notably, 
when subsequently confronted with another discrimination case 
involving parental leave, the Constitutional Court came down 
squarely on the side of gender equality. Alexei Ostaev, the father 
of three children (including a disabled child and a child under 3) 
was the sole bread-winner in his family when he was abruptly 
fired in 2010 from his private-sector job as part of a company-
wide staff reduction. Under the Russian labor code (Article 261), 
a woman finding herself in Ostaev’s position could not be dis-
missed from her job. Ostaev demanded similar protections, and 
the Constitutional Court ultimately agreed that he was entitled to 
the same right to employment in such circumstances. According 
to the Constitutional Court, the equal rights and duties of parents 
for the upbringing of their children required the state to take all 
possible measures to ensure that both parents exercised the same 
responsibilities in the upbringing of their children.41
Valerii Zorkin (L), Russian Chairman of the Russian Constitutional 
Court, and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
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The Ostaev ruling contained no 
direct citation to the Markin case, so 
one can only speculate to what extent 
the Constitutional Court tacitly used this 
decision to close the gap between itself 
and the ECtHR on the question of gen-
der discrimination.42 On a broader level, 
these two disputes shed important light 
on Russia’s ongoing legal struggle for the 
protection of social rights. Article 7(1) 
of the Russian Constitution proudly pro-
claims that Russia is a social state,43 and 
public opinion polls consistently show 
that citizens value these social rights over 
other civil and property rights.44 Such 
tendencies were further supported in this 
year’s ombudsman’s report on human 
rights, where every fourth complaint 
involved a violation of social rights.45
Russia’s legal battle for social rights is often overlooked in the 
western literature on Russian law; indeed, especially from a U.S. 
perspective, the elevation of such rights as constitutional rights 
is often perceived as overly problematic, particularly in terms 
of implementation and 
economic costs.46 This 
may well be true, but 
as this article demon-
strates, Russians are 
actively engaged in 
the legal defense of 
these social rights, and 
plaintiffs have achieved 
some notable victories 
through the courts 
(although enforce-
ment remains a chal-
lenge). In the aftermath 
of recent elections, 
the primary focus of 
Russia’s human rights 
debate will be on the demand for political 
and civil rights. The realization of social 
rights, however, represents an important 
but largely disregarded second front in 
the fight for human rights in Russia, and 
the ECtHR remains a direct — and indi-
rect — participant in this struggle.
ConClusion: BaCk  
From the Brink
The Markin case ended quietly, with-
out the public acrimony that had char-
acterized most of the process. Russia 
appealed the original decision to the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, which 
heard arguments in June 2011. The 
Grand Chamber issued the final verdict 
on March 22, 2012, where it upheld the 
original decision and increased Markin’s 
total award to 6,150 Euros.47 Yet this decision did not spark 
another round of controversy, in part, according to Russia’s rep-
resentative at the ECtHR, because the Chamber toned down the 
polemics and concentrated on the facts.48 The Chamber further 
did not formally recommend a change in Russian law, although 
Markin’s lawyer insisted that new legislation was still required 
to fulfill the court’s ruling.49
Therefore, it appears that Russia once again has backed away 
from the edge in its uneasy relationship with the ECtHR. By its 
very mandate, the ECtHR intrudes on the national sovereignty of 
its members, and Russia is by no means unique among member 
states in reacting to what it perceives as direct interference in 
domestic affairs. This inherent tension will not go away any time 
soon, especially in light of Russia’s poor human rights record. 
Other storm clouds appear on the horizon as well, such as the 
recent raft of anti-gay legislation in Russia as well as Putin’s new 
NGO and anti-protest laws.50 Nevertheless, dialogue has to date 
prevailed over confrontation in Russia’s interactions with the 
ECtHR, with considerable benefits for individual Russian citi-
zens, the Russian legal system, and the ongoing fight for human 
rights in the Russian Federation.
Former Acting Chairman of the Federation 
Council Aleksandr Torshin.
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